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DEPARTING FROM SEMINOLE ROCK
DEFERENCE: IN DECKER, A SHIFT IN TIDE
Benjamin Clements
In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,1 the
Supreme Court upheld a deferential standard of review first
announced in 1945.2 Under the standard, courts defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless “it
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”3
The Decker Court aptly recognized that the standard “go[es] to
the heart of administrative law” and “arise[s] as a matter of course on
a regular basis.”4 But in addition, the Court for the first time raised
serious questions about the standard’s propriety.5
I. INTRODUCTION
The Decker litigation began after logging and paper-products
companies (the “logging companies”) contracted with the state of
Oregon to harvest timber.6 The logging companies used two roads
for that purpose.7 Rainfall caused water to run off the roads,
displacing dirt and crushed gravel into nearby rivers and streams,
endangering fish and other aquatic life.8
The Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) filed
suit, asserting that the logging companies discharged stormwater into
 J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Economics, French,
Bucknell University, May 2010. I am extremely grateful to Professor Daniel P. Selmi for his
insight, guidance, and encouragement throughout the writing process. Thank you also to the staff
and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their commitment to the editorial
process and discerning feedback. Finally, thank you to my parents and sister, who always have
supported me in my endeavors.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
2. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
3. Id. at 414.
4. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
5. Id. at 1339–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. Id. at 1333 (majority opinion).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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two Oregon rivers without obtaining the permits required by the
Clean Water Act.9 The district court dismissed the action, ruling that
the Act did not require permits for the runoff.10 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that permits were
required.11
The Supreme Court reversed.12 A seven-justice majority upheld
the standard by deferring to the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) interpretation of its own regulation.13 In a brief concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the Court had
“some interest” in reconsidering the standard, but decided that
Decker was not the case to reexamine the standard’s propriety.14
Justice Scalia, in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
disagreed.15 It is his dissent that makes Decker a potentially
significant development in administrative law, essentially inviting
practitioners to preserve the issue for appeal and raise it for review
by the Court.16
This Comment posits that Decker’s legacy will be to change the
standard, known as Seminole Rock deference. For sixty-eight years,
the standard has been a hallmark of administrative law. It has
enjoyed a relatively unblemished existence. But Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Decker gives voice to the criticisms of the standard on a
new and elevated platform, and it consolidates them into a
succinct—if one-sided—argument.
In particular, the principle of separation of powers undermines
Seminole Rock deference.17 The proposition that the same entity

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1333–34.
12. Id. at 1338.
13. Justice Breyer did not participate. Id.
14. Id. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
15. Id. at 1339–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. See Quin M. Sorenson, Decker v. NEDC: A New Dispute over Judicial Deference to an
Agency’s Interpretation of Its Own Regulation, 44 No. 6 ABA TRENDS 9, 12 (July/August 2013)
(“[C]ounsel in any administrative law case . . . in which the Auer doctrine may play a role would
be well-advised to preserve and press that challenge throughout the proceedings, to ensure that
their case, if it reaches the Court, qualifies as one in which . . . ‘the issue is properly raised and
argued.’”).
17. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 631 (1996) (“By permitting agencies
both to write regulations and to construe them authoritatively, Seminole Rock effectively unifies
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should not make law and enforce it favors a lower standard of
deference than that currently afforded. The principle also
distinguishes Seminole Rock deference from a similar deferential
standard announced more recently in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,18 which requires courts to
defer to an agency’s “permissible” construction of a statute it
administers if the statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue” under review.19
This distinction is important because much of the discussion
surrounding Seminole Rock’s propriety stems from that surrounding
Chevron.20 Consequently, any reason for departing from Seminole
Rock deference would ideally explain why courts should treat agency
interpretations of agency rules differently from agency
interpretations of statutes. In that respect, the separation of powers
concern fits the bill.21
The Comment proceeds as follows: Part II presents the history
of the deferential standard, discussing relevant case law and the
Administrative Procedure Act. Part III examines the Decker Court’s
analysis, progressing from the majority opinion to Justice Scalia’s
concurring and dissenting opinion. Part IV then offers thoughts about
the case’s impact on the future of the standard, arguing that the
separation of powers demands a lower degree of judicial deference
for agency interpretations of regulations. Finally, Part V concludes.
II. HISTORY
A. Seminole Rock
The deferential standard of review originated in the 1945 case of
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.22 In April 1942, to stymie
wartime inflation, the administrator of the Office of Price
lawmaking and law-exposition—a combination of powers decisively rejected by our
constitutional structure.”).
18. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
19. Id. at 843.
20. See Manning, supra note 17, at 627 (“Seminole Rock adopts an approach to agency
interpretations of regulations that . . . is quite similar to Chevron’s framework for statutes.”).
21. Id. at 639 (“[W]hereas Chevron retains one independent interpretive check on
lawmaking by Congress, Seminole Rock leaves in place no independent interpretive check on
lawmaking by an administrative agency.”).
22. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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Administration issued regulations controlling the prices of goods and
services in the national economy.23 The regulatory scheme required
sellers to charge no more for their goods and services than the prices
they had charged during the month of March 1942 (the “price freeze
requirement”).24 A dispute arose over the Administrator’s
interpretation of the price freeze requirement.25
In October 1941 the Seminole Rock & Sand Company, a
manufacturer of crushed stone, contracted to sell crushed stone to a
railroad company at a price of sixty cents per ton.26 Then, in January
1942 it contracted to sell crushed stone to a construction company
for $1.50 per ton.27 It delivered the stone from the first sale in March
1942 and the stone from the second sale in January and August
1942.28 When Seminole Rock then made new contracts with the
railroad company at both prices of eighty-five cents and $1.00 per
ton, the administrator filed suit, asserting that the price freeze
requirement set Seminole Rock’s maximum price for crushed stone
at sixty cents per ton.29
This conclusion turned on the administrator’s interpretation of
the regulatory phrase “[h]ighest price charged during March,
1942.”30 In his opinion, because Seminole Rock had delivered
crushed stone to the railroad in March 1942, the regulation precluded
it from charging more than the price charged for that delivery: sixty
cents per ton.31
Seminole Rock disagreed, asserting that the administrator’s
interpretation of the price freeze requirement attached to a sale only
if both the charge and the delivery occurred during March 1942.
Since it had entered its contract with the construction company prior
to March but not yet delivered all of the ordered stone, Seminole

23. Id. at 413.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 413–15.
26. Id. at 412.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 414; see also id. at 415 (“The dispute in this instance centers about the meaning
and applicability of rule (i).”).
31. Id. at 415.
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Rock argued that its highest offering price as of that month—$1.50
per ton—should determine the new maximum.32
The Court reasoned that it “must necessarily look to the
administrative construction of the regulation” to resolve any textual
ambiguity.33 It continued: “[T]he ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. . . .
Our only tools, therefore, are the plain words of the regulation and
any relevant interpretations of the [administrative agency].”34
Applying these “tools,” the Court first examined the regulation’s
language, concluding that the price freeze requirement turned on
whether goods were actually delivered during the month of March
1942.35 To bolster that conclusion, the Court pointed to evidence of
the administrator’s interpretation—that “delivery during March,
rather than the making of a sale during March, is controlling.”36
The Seminole Rock Court provided no justification or citation to
authority for the standard it articulated.37 Over the years, however,
academics and courts have fleshed out the rationales ostensibly
underlying Seminole Rock deference.38 Today, the standard is a
centerpiece of administrative law.39
B. The Administrative Procedure Act
Shortly after the Court decided Seminole Rock, Congress
enacted the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).40 The
purpose of the APA was to create a check on the power of
administrative agencies, by protecting private rights from
administrative “excesses.”41
32. Id.
33. Id. at 413–14.
34. Id. at 414.
35. Id. at 415–17.
36. Id. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (2011).
38. See discussion infra Part II.C.
39. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
40. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596, 701–706 (2006).
41. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950); see also Robert A. Anthony,
The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1,
9–10 (1996) (stating that the APA intended to “arm affected persons with recourse to an
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The APA set in place two means of accomplishing that task.
First, it established procedural requirements that must be met before
agency rules have the force of law. Second, it provided for judicial
review of agency actions.42
1. Procedural Safeguards for Legislative Rules
To promulgate rules that have the force of law, agencies must
abide by certain procedural safeguards that act as a check on
administrative actions.43 The most prominent of these are notice-andcomment requirements, under which agencies must provide the
public with notice of proposed rules and the opportunity to
respond.44
Section 553 outlines these requirements.45 The agency’s notice
must state the time and place of the rulemaking proceedings, the
legal basis authorizing the proposed rule, and a description of the
underlying issues, if not the terms of the rule.46 The agency must
then allow the public to participate in the proceedings.47
Exempted from section 553’s notice-and-comment requirements
are “interpretative,”48 often referred to as “interpretive,” rules.49
These rules do not have the force of law but are instead issued “to
advise the public” of how the agency interprets the statutes and rules
it administers.50

independent judicial interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agency is often
an adverse party”).
42. Stephenson and Pogoriler refer to this dichotomy as the “‘pay me now or pay me later’
principle.” Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1464.
43. See Anthony, supra note 41, at 3; Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules,
“Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 1, 3–4
(1994).
44. See Anthony, supra note 41, at 3; Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules,
“Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 1, 3–4
(1994).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
46. Id. § 553(b)(1)–(3).
47. Id. § 553(c).
48. Id. § 553(b)(A).
49. Anthony, supra note 43, at 1–2; Anthony, supra note 41, at 8 n.16.
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947).

A SHIFT IN TIDE

2014]

9/25/2014 5:11 PM

A SHIFT IN TIDE

545

Though the APA explicitly distinguishes between legislative and
interpretive rules, Seminole Rock deference does not.51 A common
criticism of the standard, therefore, is that it applies regardless of
whether the agency interpretation is of a legislative rule promulgated
pursuant to the APA’s procedures—and thus subject to notice and
comment by the public—or an interpretive rule exempted from those
procedures.52
2. Judicial Review
Section 706 addresses the judiciary’s role in reviewing agency
decisions.53 It provides that “the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law . . . and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”54 The latter term—
“agency action”—specifically encompasses “the whole or a part of
an agency rule.”55
Congress thus exercised its constitutional authority to expressly
define the relationship between the judiciary and administrative
agencies. It chose to delegate to the courts the power to determine
the meaning or applicability of agency rules. Another common
criticism of Seminole Rock deference, therefore, is its apparent
defiance of Congress’s prerogative.56 Similarly, the deferential
standard seems to contravene Marbury v. Madison,57 which
unequivocally pronounced the judicial role: “to say what the law
is.”58
51. See Anthony, supra note 41, at 6 (“The Court appears to be willing to accept any
‘interpretation’ that is not inconsistent with the regulation . . . regardless of agency failure to
observe notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.”).
52. See id. (“The Court fails to separate the question of the weight to be given the
interpretation from the question of whether the interpretative document is one that is entitled to
exemption from APA notice-and-comment requirements.”).
53. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. § 551(13).
56. See Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court’s Deferences—A Foolish
Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 10, 10–11 (2000) (“The review standard directly
flouts § 706’s command . . . .”); Anthony, supra note 41, at 6 (“[Seminole Rock deference]
contravenes the spirit of the APA . . . .”); Manning, supra note 17, at 621 (“[T]he APA . . .
instructs reviewing courts” to interpret regulations.).
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. Id. at 177; see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the agency’s role is to
formulate the rules, and the court’s role “is to determine the fair meaning of the rule”); Manning,
supra note 17, at 621; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1457.
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And yet the Court rarely addresses the APA when it should.59
Consistently, the Court fails to mention section 706 when applying
Seminole Rock deference.60 As a consequence, the degree of
deference afforded by Seminole Rock encourages agencies “to issue
vague regulations, and then to make the operative law through
‘interpretations’ of those regulations.”61 This unchecked authority
was precisely the worry underlying Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Decker,62 and one that implicates the separation of powers, a concern
going to the core of our nation’s constitutional structure.63
C. Rationales
Chief among the rationales offered to justify Seminole Rock
deference is the theory of implied delegation. The theory posits that
Congress, by expressly delegating rulemaking authority to agencies,
impliedly delegates the authority to say what those rules mean.64
Whether or not courts explicitly refer to this rationale,65 courts
employ this legal fiction to justify deferring to agencies’ expertise,
which makes sense due to the technical nature of many regulatory

59. Anthony, supra note 41, at 2.
60. Id. at 5 n.10.
61. Id. at 6; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997) (“A rule requiring the
Secretary [of Labor] to construe his own regulations narrowly would make little sense, since he is
free to write the regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the
statute.”); Manning, supra note 17, at 655 (“The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock
removes an important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency
can say what its own regulations mean (unless the agency’s view is plainly erroneous), the agency
bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or imprecision.”).
62. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining that when an agency interprets its own rules, “[t]he power to prescribe is augmented
by the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak vaguely and broadly, so as to retain a
‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with retroactive effect”).
63. Id.; see also Manning, supra note 17, at 654 (asserting that Seminole Rock deference
“contradicts the constitutional premise that lawmaking and law-exposition must be distinct”).
64. See Manning, supra note 17, at 627, 654; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at
1457.
65. E.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151
(1991).
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schemes.66 It also excuses unelected judges from making potentially
political decisions better left to another branch of government.67
The theory of implied delegation appears to have largely
replaced the “originalist” explanation for the doctrine.68 The
originalist theory rationalizes Seminole Rock deference on the ground
that the agency interpreting the regulation under review also issued
the regulation and understands it better than courts, particularly
where the subject matter is technical.69 This explanation, however,
ignores the reality that courts determine a regulation’s meaning
primarily by looking at its plain language, not the intent of the
issuing agency.70 It also raises new questions without answering
them, such as whether deference should be due when a significant
amount of time has passed since the regulation’s promulgation, or
when an agency has inconsistently interpreted a regulation over
time.71
D. Auer
These rationales were much more fully developed by 1997,
when the Court decided Auer v. Robbins.72 In Auer, a unanimous
Court upheld the secretary of labor’s interpretation of a regulation
promulgated under authority delegated by the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA).73
In 1988, St. Louis police sergeants and a lieutenant filed suit
against members of the board of police commissioners seeking
overtime pay under section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA (the “overtime pay
requirement”).74 The FLSA, however, exempts from the overtime

66. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1456–57, 1459; see also Decker, 133 S. Ct. at
1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To give an agency less control over
the meaning of its own regulations than it has over the meaning of a congressionally enacted
statute seems quite odd.”); Manning, supra note 17, at 629–30 (explaining that the agency’s
expertise justifies deference to agency interpretations of regulations).
67. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1456–57, 1459–60; accord Manning, supra
note 17, at 630.
68. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1457; Manning, supra note 17, at 630–31.
69. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Manning, supra note 17, at 631; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1454.
70. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1455.
72. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
73. Id. at 453, 461–62.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1994); Auer, 519 U.S. at 455.
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pay requirement those “employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity.”75 To clarify when an
employee falls within the exemption, the secretary issued regulations
extending the exemption only to employees earning a salary.76 The
regulations defined “salary” as a predetermined amount of money
not “subject to reduction” based on the quality or quantity of the
employee’s work.77
The parties disputed whether the sergeants’ and lieutenant’s pay
was “subject to” reduction within the meaning of the regulations.78
The sergeants and lieutenant asserted that they were not salaried
employees because the department’s policy theoretically provided
for disciplinary deductions in pay.79 The secretary, however, read the
regulation to require more than a theoretical possibility of reductions
in pay.80 Under his reading, the regulation required either “an actual
practice of making such deductions” or “a ‘significant likelihood’ of
such deductions.”81 His interpretation accounted for the reality that to
find otherwise would potentially subject employers with vague
disciplinary policies to substantial overtime pay liability.82
The Court, citing Seminole Rock, deferred to the secretary’s
interpretation.83 It confined its review of that interpretation to two
dictionary definitions of the “critical phrase”: “subject to.”84 It then
concluded that the phrase “comfortably bears the meaning the
Secretary assigns,”85 and it denied the sergeants and lieutenant
relief.86
E. Chevron
For good reason, much of the recent scholarship focusing on
Seminole Rock deference incorporates the deferential standard

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1994); Auer, 519 U.S. at 455.
Auer, 519 U.S. at 455; see 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(e) (1996).
29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1996); Auer, 519 U.S. at 455.
Auer, 519 U.S. at 459.
Id. at 455, 459–60.
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464.
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announced in Chevron.87 Chevron requires courts to defer to an
agency’s “permissible” construction of a statute if the statute is
“silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” under
review.88 Deference is due whether Congress expressly or impliedly
leaves statutory ambiguities for the administrative agency to
resolve.89
The Court has made clear that the theory of implied delegation
supports Chevron deference.90 That theory seeks to identify
congressional intent by asking, What governmental body did
Congress want to resolve the ambiguities it left in its statutory
language? According to the theory, Congress prefers administrative
agencies to courts.91 In other words, the theory is just as much about
judicial self-restraint and adhering to the Constitution’s separation of
powers mandate as it is about recognizing the expertise of agencies.92
Increasingly, however, the Court has backed away from the
blanket rule of Chevron, favoring instead a more nuanced
approach.93 In 2000, for example, the Court held that a statutory
interpretation issued in an informal opinion letter “do[es] not warrant
Chevron-style deference.”94 In 2001, the Court affirmed that
principle, holding that statutory constructions issued by agencies,
without procedural safeguards, should not necessarily be afforded
Chevron deference.95
Decker indicates that a similar retreat from the blanket deference
afforded by Seminole Rock may be on the horizon. A retreat would
be appropriate because of the principle of separation of powers. For
although the theory of implied delegation does not violate that
principle when an administrative agency interprets a statute, the same
cannot be said when the agency interprets a regulation—a creature of

87. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
88. Id. at 843.
89. Id. at 843–44.
90. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996); Manning, supra note
17, at 630–31.
91. Id.
92. See Manning, supra note 17, at 629 (explaining that courts interpreting statutes and
regulations must be “sensitiv[e] to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches in our
system of government” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1450–51.
94. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
95. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235–38 (2001).
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its own making. Tempering Seminole Rock, therefore, is, at least in
one respect, more easily justified than tempering Chevron.96
III. ANALYSIS
During the March 2013 Term, the Decker Court upheld
Seminole Rock deference by affirming the EPA’s interpretation of a
regulation promulgated under authority delegated by the Clean Water
Act.97 But three of the Court’s members seemed to signal a growing
distaste for the standard.98
Before addressing Decker’s three opinions, this Comment will
discuss three matters to set the stage: first, the provisions and
implementing regulations of the Clean Water Act necessary to
explain the dispute; second, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling; and third, the
EPA’s interpretation of its own regulation.
A. The Clean Water Act and Its Implementing Regulations
The Clean Water Act of 197299 (the “Act”) implemented a
permitting scheme to protect the nation’s waters from pollution.100
Under the Act, pollution from any “point source” requires a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, unless the
particular discharge is exempted.101 A “point source” is any
“conveyance”—such as a pipe, ditch, or tunnel—“from which
pollutants are or may be discharged.”102
Congress has exempted most discharges “composed entirely of
stormwater.”103 There is, however, an exception to that exemption:
stormwater discharges “associated with industrial activity” continue
to require permits.104 The question in Decker was whether particular
stormwater discharges were “associated with industrial activity” as
the EPA defined the term.105
96. See discussion infra Part IV.
97. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1329–30 (2013).
98. Id. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1339–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
99. 86 Stat. 816; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
100. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331.
101. Id.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994).
103. See infra Part III.A.2.
104. See infra Part III.A.2.
105. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336.
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1. The Silvicultural Rule
In 1973, the EPA issued regulations exempting some pointsource discharges from the Act’s permit requirements.106 For
example, it exempted discharges composed entirely of
uncontaminated stormwater and discharges from silvicultural
activities107—that is, activities dealing with “the development and
care of forests.”108 It did so because these discharges accounted for a
large number of point sources and including them made the
permitting scheme “unworkable.”109
The Natural Resources Defense Council filed suit, challenging
the EPA’s authority to create the exemptions.110 The District Court
for the District of Columbia held that the Act did not authorize the
EPA to exempt any type of point-source discharge.111 Congress, it
reasoned, did not “approve[] exemptions for . . . categories of point
sources” other than those it itself expressly exempted.112 Thus, in
1976, while its appeal was pending, the EPA amended the
regulations to more precisely define the types of discharges that were
point sources, rather than categorically exempt some point
sources.113
One such regulation (the “Silvicultural Rule”) concerned
discharges from silvicultural activities. Under the Silvicultural Rule,
only activities discharging pollutants “‘as a result of controlled water
used by a person’” qualified as point sources.114 Those activities, the
EPA decided, included only “rock crushing, gravel washing, log

106. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (D.D.C. 1975).
107. Id.
108. Silviculture Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/silviculture (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
109. Train, 396 F. Supp. at 1395.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1398, 1402.
112. Id. at 1398.
113. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1331 (2013). In 1977, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
114. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 41 Fed.
Reg. 6282 (Feb. 12, 1976)).
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sorting, or log storage facilities.”115 Not included were timber
“harvesting operations” “from which there is natural runoff.”116
2. The Industrial Activity Rule
In 1987, Congress amended the Act to exempt from the NPDES
permitting scheme most discharges “composed entirely of
stormwater” (the “stormwater exemption”).117 It did so to ease the
EPA’s burden of managing discharges composed only of stormwater
runoff.118 The burden was tremendous, because the definition of
“point source” encompassed a broad variety of potential sources of
stormwater runoff—including schools, churches, and homes—all of
which would require permits.119
Congress, however, did not exempt stormwater discharges
“associated with industrial activity.”120 Thus, even if a particular
discharge fell within the stormwater exemption, it still required an
NPDES permit if it was “associated with industrial activity”—a term
Congress did not define.121
In 1990, the EPA promulgated regulations for the exempted
stormwater discharges.122 In 1992, history repeated itself: The Ninth
Circuit held some of the regulations invalid because the EPA did not
have authority to exempt discharges coming from concededly
industrial activity.123
One 1990 regulation (the “Industrial Activity Rule”) filled the
void that Congress had left by defining the term “associated with
industrial activity.”124 For example, stormwater discharges are
associated with industrial activity if they are “directly related to
manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an
industrial plant.”125 The same is true if stormwater discharges come
115. 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (2011). The current version of the Silvicultural Rule, quoted
above, differs only slightly from the amended version issued in 1976. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1077.
116. 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1).
117. Decker, 133 S. Ct at 1332 (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at 1331–32.
119. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1082.
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (1994).
121. Decker, 133 S. Ct at 1332 (2013).
122. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1083.
123. Natural Res. Def. Council v. E.P.A., 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992); see supra note
112 and accompanying text.
124. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006).
125. Id.
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from “immediate access roads . . . used or traveled by carriers of raw
materials” in connection with an “industrial facility” operating in one
of the predetermined industries.126 “[I]mmediate access roads” are
“exclusively or primarily dedicated for use by the industrial
facility.”127
In addition to defining “associated with industrial activity,” the
Industrial Activity Rule identifies certain types of business facilities
across different industries that are “considered to be engaging in
‘industrial activity.’”128 It does so by referencing the Standard
Industrial Classifications—a system used by administrative agencies
to group business firms by industry.129 For example, the regulation
refers to Standard Industrial Classification 24, which covers the
“Lumber and Wood Products” industry and includes the logging
business.130 Logging facilities are “[e]stablishments primarily
engaged in cutting timber and in producing . . . forest or wood raw
materials.”131
The result is that permits are required for silvicultural point
sources, as defined by the Silvicultural Rule, that are “associated
with industrial activity,” as defined by the Industrial Activity Rule.
The substantive question in Decker, therefore, was whether
stormwater discharges coming from a timber-harvesting operation
were “associated with industrial activity.”132 If so, then the Act,
through the Industrial Activity Rule, required the logging companies
to obtain NPDES permits.133 If not, no permits were required under
the stormwater exemption.134

126. Id.
127. 55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 48009 (Nov. 16, 1990); see Brown, 640 F.3d at 1084.
128. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006).
129. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1332 (2013).
130. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. at 1332 (quoting Dept. of Labor, Standard Industrial Classifications Manual,
available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html); see 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)
(2006).
132. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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B. The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling
The logging companies argued that permits were not required.135
They asserted that the Silvicultural Rule excluded from the definition
of “point source” the stormwater runoff at issue.136 The Ninth Circuit
rejected the argument. It concluded that stormwater runoff is
statutorily not a point source if “allowed to run off naturally,” but
does constitute such a source if it is controlled in some manner—if,
for example, it is collected and then discharged.137
The logging companies also argued that no permits were
required because of the 1987 stormwater exemption.138 They asserted
that logging sites were not “associated with industrial activity”
because they were not “industrial facilities.”139 Despite the Industrial
Activity Rule’s express incorporation of logging facilities by
reference to Standard Industrial Classification 24, they maintained
that logging sites were not “traditional industrial plants,” meaning
the roads used by them were not “immediate access roads” subject to
the regulation.140
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the discharges
were unambiguously “associated with industrial activity.”141 The
court pointed to the many facilities—“including mines, landfills,
junkyards, and construction sites”—that the rule classified as
conducting industrial activity, even though they were not traditional
industrial plants.142 Applying the same reasoning used in 1992 to
strike down different EPA regulations,143 the court concluded that the
agency did not have authority to exempt point-source discharges that
were concededly industrial in nature.144

135. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1070–71.
138. Id. at 1069.
139. Id. at 1084.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1085; see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1333–34 (2013)
(“[T]he Court of Appeals held that . . . the discharges at issue are ‘associated with industrial
action’ within the meaning of the regulation . . . .”).
142. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1084.
143. See supra notes 111, 121 and accompanying text.
144. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1085.
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C. The EPA’s Interpretation of the Industrial Activity Rule
The EPA disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, and three days before
the Supreme Court heard arguments, it amended the Industrial
Activity Rule.145 The agency submitted to the Decker Court its
interpretation of the pre-amendment rule in an amicus curiae brief.146
It concluded that the discharges at issue did not require permits,
focusing on the regulation’s reference to industrial “facilities,” which
it reasoned were more “fixed and permanent” than “temporary . . .
logging installations.”147
It also concluded that timber-harvesting operations, like the one
in Oregon, did not “manufacture” or “process” materials and were
not “raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.”148 This meant
stormwater discharges could be “directly related” to the harvesting of
timber without falling within the scope of the Industrial Activity
Rule.
These distinctions, the agency felt, meant the discharges at issue
were not “associated with industrial activity” and, therefore, did not
require permits due to the 1987 stormwater exemption.149 It is this
interpretation to which the Court ultimately deferred.150
D. The Decker Majority
As a preliminary matter, the Court addressed two jurisdictional
questions.151 It first ruled that a particular provision of the Act—
which made judicial review the exclusive means of reviewing certain
agency actions and set a time bar for that review—did not preclude
NEDC’s suit.152 Second, it ruled that the EPA’s amendment of the
Industrial Activity Rule did not render the Court’s review of the
Ninth Circuit ruling moot.153
The Court then turned to the merits. It first concluded that, as a
general matter, logging activities are not necessarily “industrial” in
145. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1332; see 77 Fed. Reg. 72974 (Dec. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 122, sub pt. B).
146. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336 (citing “Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae”).
147. Id. at 1336–37.
148. Id. at 1337.
149. Id. at 1337.
150. Id. at 1338.
151. Id. at 1334–36.
152. Id. at 1334–35.
153. Id. at 1335–36.
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nature, since by definition “industrial” activities might be only the
limited production processes occurring in factories.154 It then more
specifically considered whether the discharges at issue were
“associated with industrial activity.”155
In so doing, the Court rejected the conclusion reached by both
NEDC and the Ninth Circuit—that the Industrial Activity Rule’s
incorporation of Standard Industrial Classification 24 meant logging
facilities were “associated with industrial activity.” Evidently, the
Court was not convinced that the logging industry as a whole
qualified as “industrial activity,” even though logging facilities
did.156
The majority explained away the examples of nontraditional
industrial sites the Industrial Activity Rule classified as engaging in
industrial activity.157 It reasoned that mines, landfills, junkyards, and
construction sites “tend to be more fixed and permanent than timberharvesting operations” and have a “closer connection” to traditional
industrial sites.158 The regulation’s inclusion of these nontraditional
sites, it surmised, did not necessarily imply that all stormwater
discharges from such sites were also included.159
As a result, the majority deemed the EPA’s interpretation
“permissible.”160 Focusing on the Industrial Activity Rule’s
references to “‘facilities,’ ‘establishments,’ ‘manufacturing,’
‘processing,’ and an ‘industrial plant,’” the majority found the EPA
could have reasonably concluded that only “traditional industrial
buildings such as factories and associated sites, as well as other
relatively fixed facilities,” fall within the regulation’s scope.161 In
deferring to that interpretation under Seminole Rock, the Decker
majority adhered to the well-established principle that “an agency’s
interpretation need not be the only possible reading of a regulation—
or even the best one—to prevail.”162

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E. The Chief Justice’s Concurrence
In his brief concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that he
might be receptive to reconsidering Seminole Rock deference in
some fashion.163 Justice Alito joined that sentiment.164 Both felt,
however, that it was inappropriate to address the issue when each of
the parties had limited its relevant discussion to a single footnote.165
The concurrence nevertheless underscored the important role
Seminole Rock deference plays in the Court’s administrative
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice characterized the issue as “a basic
one going to the heart of administrative law,” one that “arise[s] as a
matter of course on a regular basis.”166 He then openly stated that the
Court had “some interest in reconsidering” the standard.167 But it was
Justice Scalia who, in the case’s last opinion, explained why the
Court should act on that interest.168
F. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part
Justice Scalia agreed only with the majority’s handling of the
two jurisdictional issues.169 He emphatically disagreed with its
handling of the substantive question.170 In his view, the Court
deferred to an “unnatural” regulatory interpretation “simply because
[the] EPA says that it believes the unnatural reading is right.”171
When it came to Seminole Rock deference, Justice Scalia reasoned,
“Enough is enough.”172
Justice Scalia began from the proposition that Seminole Rock
deference is really the same blanket deference afforded by Chevron,
but applied to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous regulations
rather than of statutes.173 Were it anything less, the standard would
be of no use, since any interpretation “different from the fairest

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reading . . . is in that sense ‘inconsistent’ with the regulation.”174
Absent blanket deference, the standard would compel deference only
when the court adjudged the agency’s interpretation to be the
“fairest”—that is, only when the court agreed with the agency.
From there, Justice Scalia discussed the prevailing rationales for
the standard and concluded that none could justify the violation of
separation of powers principles.175 Addressing the merits, he found
that permits were required.176
1. Existing Rationales and the Separation of Powers
In Justice Scalia’s view, there is no “persuasive” rationale for
Seminole Rock deference.177 He dismissed the originalist rationale
because courts do not consider the agency’s intent when interpreting
a regulation, but the regulation’s plain language.178 He dismissed the
“agency expertise” rationale as confusing the role of administrative
agencies with that of the courts: agencies make rules, and courts
interpret them.179 In his view, an agency’s expertise explains why it
should regulate and decide policy but not why it should have
authority to interpret the regulations it makes.180 To the contrary, the
“agency expertise” rationale ignores the most basic separation of
powers principle: an entity with the power to make law should not
also have the authority to interpret and enforce it.181
Justice Scalia, therefore, directly refuted the theory of implied
delegation in the context of agency interpretations of regulations. In
his view, though the theory explains why deference is due in the
Chevron context, “there is surely no congressional implication that
[an] agency can resolve ambiguities in its own regulations.”182
Violating that principle creates the potential for abuse. For
example, agencies may endeavor to maintain flexibility by issuing
vague regulations that they may conveniently interpret when a

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
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dispute arises.183 Viewed in this light, Seminole Rock deference “is
not a logical corollary to Chevron but a dangerous permission slip
for the arrogation of power.”184
Finally, Justice Scalia distinguished Seminole Rock from
Chevron by noting that administrative agencies may amend
regulations if a reviewing court disagrees with their
interpretations.185 The EPA, for example, amended the Industrial
Activity Rule after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling but before the Supreme
Court even heard arguments.186 Similarly, the EPA amended the
Silvicultural Rule after the D.C. District Court’s 1975 ruling but
before the D.C. Circuit’s 1977 ruling.187 These relatively quick
turnarounds undermine the “pragmatic” benefit afforded by Seminole
Rock’s blanket deference—namely, an expedient method of
obtaining a clear articulation of a regulation’s meaning.188
2. The Merits
Accordingly, Justice Scalia would have held that permits were
required.189 Put simply, because a “series of pipes, ditches, and
channels” conveyed the runoff from the logging roads into the two
Oregon rivers,190 Justice Scalia reasoned that the discharges came
from a point source.191 He rejected the EPA’s argument that, under
the Silvicultural Rule, the discharges did not come from a point
source because they were composed of “natural runoff.”192 In his
view, “manmade pipes and ditches” conveyed the “manmade
pollutants” from “manmade forest roads” to the rivers.193
Consequently, the runoff was not “natural.”194
In addition, Justice Scalia concluded that the discharges were
“associated with industrial activity” and thus, under the Industrial

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.; see also supra Part II.B.2.
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1341–42.
Id. at 1342.
See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1343 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

A SHIFT IN TIDE

560

9/25/2014 5:11 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:539

Activity Rule, not exempt from the Act’s permitting scheme.195
Unlike the majority, he read the Industrial Activity Rule to include
logging as one of the industries considered to be engaging in
industrial activity.196
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Although the Seminole Rock Court first articulated the standard,
it did not immediately defer to the Price Administrator’s
interpretation of the price freeze requirement. Instead, it used the
interpretation to supplement its own construction of the regulation.
The Court appeared to independently conclude that the regulation
attached to transactions in which goods were actually delivered in the
month of March 1942. Only then did it turn to the agency’s
interpretation.
The same cannot be said of the Court in Auer. There, the Court
limited its discussion of the agency interpretation to two dictionary
definitions of a single phrase. This is not enough. The Court’s
approach in Seminole Rock was the better one: courts should
interpret regulations for themselves.197
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Decker explains why. Throughout his
opinion, Justice Scalia advocates upholding the “fairest” reading of
any given regulation. In his words, the judicial role “to say what the
law is”198 equates “to determin[ing] the fair meaning of the rule.”199
Similarly, in his words, interpreting a regulation equates to
determining whether “what the petitioners did . . . [was] proscribed
by the fairest reading of the regulations.”200
If the goal is to determine the “fairest” reading of a regulation,
the question then becomes how the system should ensure that result.
The word “fair,” by definition, requires an impartial party capable of
resolving a dispute.201 Administrative agencies could be such parties.
Just because an agency has an interest in the future of a regulatory
195. Id. at 1343–44.
196. Id. at 1343.
197. See Anthony, supra note 41, at 11 (“The court’s job should be to interpret the regulation,
not merely to decide whether the agency interpretation should be accepted or rejected.”).
198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
199. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. Id. at 1342.
201. See Fair Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/fair (last visited Nov. 2013).
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order does not imply that its interpretation becomes compromised
when challenged and under judicial review.202 Similarly, just because
a court reviewing an agency interpretation seeks to find the fairest
reading does not imply that what it deems fair will differ from the
agency’s interpretation.
The principle of separation of powers, however, contemplates
that administrative agencies will not be impartial, dispute-resolving
parties, even if they could be. The principle not only separates the
three branches of the federal government but also installs checks and
balances between them.203 In this way, the principle shapes the
structure of the entire system.204 It therefore accounts for the
possibility that an agency interpreting its own regulation may not
provide the fairest reading.
Thus, as a general matter, the principle of separation of powers
ensures procedural fairness. No matter the result in a given case, the
parties will likely dispute the “fairness” of the outcome. That is the
nature of the adversarial system. Therefore, regardless of whether a
court’s interpretation brings about a fair result, which will always be
open to debate, the fact that a court interprets the regulation in the
course of deciding the dispute protects “against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department.”205
The separation of powers concern, therefore, distinguishes
Seminole Rock from Chevron. When an agency interprets a statute, it
acts as “one independent interpretive check on lawmaking by
Congress.”206 The check on lawmaking by agencies does not exist
when courts defer to agency interpretations.207
V. CONCLUSION
The blanket deference afforded by Seminole Rock has come to
mean that courts no longer need to interpret regulations for

202. But see Anthony, supra note 41, at 9–10 (“The positions that agencies assert in their
interpretations of regulations often are institutionally self-interested and are intended to impose
adverse effects upon private persons.”).
203. Matthew James Tanielian, Comment, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: One
Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 965–66 (1995).
204. Id. at 966.
205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
206. Manning, supra note 17, at 639.
207. Id.

A SHIFT IN TIDE

562

9/25/2014 5:11 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:539

themselves. The result is an approach where courts abdicate the
judicial role in contravention of Marbury v. Madison and the APA.
It is time for the Court to revisit Seminole Rock. In the words of
Justice Scalia, “It is time for us to presume . . . that an agency says in
a rule what it means, and means in a rule what it says there.”208 The
opinions of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts in Decker
indicate that three members of the Court are open to reexamining the
standard. A shift in tide has come.

208. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1344 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).

